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Abstract 
In disasters, and more so in catastrophes, one of 
the most daunting problems to professional respond-
ers is gaining situational awareness. Unfortunately, 
truly actionable information (intelligence) is missing 
in the first days and even weeks of responding. Con-
sequently, incomplete situational awareness brings 
on a distorted common operating picture leading to 
suboptimal direction of responses, so more lives are 
lost, and more damage is inflicted. This study reports 
on the challenges emergency responders faced in the 
immediate aftermath of the 2014 massive landslide 
near Oso, WA. Over a hundred agencies were in-
volved in the response, which presented a huge coor-
dination task for the incident command. This study 
identifies and describes various challenges in the 
early response and also discusses recommendations 
on how to tackle and potentially mitigate the chal-
lenges identified in future responses. 
1. Introduction  
On March 22, 2014 the most massive landslide 
(not attributable to volcanic activity) in the history of 
the United States occurred near Oso, Washington. It 
killed forty-three people as well as an unknown num-
ber of animals. It also destroyed over fifty residential 
structures and cut off Washington State Route 530 
(SR530) at a length of more than one mile. 
After the immensity of the incident was under-
stood, President Obama declared it a national disas-
ter. The response and early recovery effort extended 
for almost three months, and the SR530 only opened 
to the public in late September, after it had been freed 
from the mud cover and partly rebuilt in the worst 
affected area. To this day, the debris field looks like a 
moon landscape, and the affected local communities 
recover only slowly. 
A total of 119 agencies from all levels of gov-
ernment were involved in the response including the 
National Guard, the Coast Guard, the State Emer-
gency Management Division, FEMA Region X, Sno-
homish County, the Department of Natural Re-
sources, EPA, among others as well as dozens of re-
lief organizations. More than a thousand individuals 
participated in the response effort. 
Response efforts on this scale are extremely com-
plex undertakings, and they require enormous mana-
gerial, operational, and tactical skills on part of the 
responders. Responders use many traditional and 
novel technologies to do their jobs. They have to rely 
on effective information infrastructures to facilitate 
what is called “situational awareness,” which then 
can be formed into a so-called “common operating 
picture.” In other words, accurate and reliable infor-
mation is the most important and most scarce re-
source in early disaster response. A lack of situational 
awareness leads to issues in the coordination of re-
sponse units and presents challenges to the incident 
command system, which is widely (and, for that mat-
ter, successfully) used in US disaster response. For 
this study, first responders from several levels of 
government were interviewed, among whom were the 
local responders first on site, members of the Snoho-
mish County Emergency Operating Center, the inci-
dent commanders, responders from neighboring mu-
nicipalities and counties under mutual-aid agreement 
as well as urban search and rescue teams (USAR), 
the State Emergency Management Division (EMD), 
the WA National Guard, and FEMA Region X.  
The paper is organized as follows: First, the ex-
tant literature on disaster response and situation 
awareness is reviewed. Then, the study’s research 
questions are outlined, followed by the methodology 
section. Next, the findings are presented succeeded 
by a discussion of the insights from the findings. Fi-
nally, conclusions are conferred along with directions 
for future research on the subject.  
2. Literature Review 
The mission-critical role of actionable and inte-
grated information in disaster response has increas-
ingly been emphasized in recent research ([10, 21, 
24]). Shared situational awareness leading to a shared 
common operating picture [9, 10, 17, 24] are consid-
ered foundational to agile, disciplined, and effective 
emergency and disaster response [16]. However, the 
larger the disaster the more agencies respond, and the 
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more complex is the coordination of action [7, 18]. 
Gaining and maintaining shared situational awareness 
in “the complex, heterogeneous emergency manage-
ment structure” is seen as ”exceedingly difficult,” 
and “the assumption that shared situational awareness 
will be easily achieved are doomed to failure” [17, p. 
1]. Endsley who laid the foundations to a theory of 
situation awareness (SA) in the context of combat 
aviation [8, 9] recently recognized an unaddressed 
and vast research problem surrounding SA, in gen-
eral, and shared SA, in particular, by pointing at a 
“myriad of problems” with regard to “data overload, 
poor integration of information to support compre-
hension and projection,...poor information represen-
tation, and inadequate flow of information…” [10, p. 
164]. However, despite the obvious need for address-
ing these informational problems in SA few studies, 
if any, were found, which incorporate an information 
perspective.  
The three levels of perception, comprehension, 
projection in SA [9] are dynamically intertwined im-
plicating level-specific and stakeholder-specific in-
formation needs, which require systematic study. 
Furthermore, the information needs of disaster re-
sponders on each SA level lead to specific informa-
tion behaviors [3]), which may vary individually as 
well as for larger groups. Extreme event-related in-
formation needs and information behaviors in turn 
entail SA level-specific and responder-specific in-
formation flows. These information flows and their 
potential disruptions also need to be studied in detail. 
The information perspective provides a sharp lens on 
disaster-specific information needs, information be-
haviors, and information flows among and between 
responders during an unfolding disaster. 
The information perspective is a human actor- 
and action-centric perspective. It is concerned with 
technologies as the potential facilitators of informa-
tion needs, behaviors, and flows, but not for their 
own sake. Information and communication technolo-
gies (ICTs) have assumed increasingly important 
roles in supporting and facilitating information be-
havior and information flows, in general. In disaster 
management, they have become key elements [4, 18] 
in providing high-quality, mission-critical, and timely 
and actionable information, fulfilling the rapidly 
changing ad-hoc information needs of first respond-
ers [18, 19, 26]), although they can also be the cause 
for information overload, work overload, and other 
stressors [10]. Information behavior and information 
flows under disaster conditions depend on robust and 
resourceful information infrastructures, which are 
embedded in social structures and processes (includ-
ing formal and informal organizational processes) as 
their key elements [6, 22, 26]. 
3. Research Questions 
The research questions that guide this exploratory 
inquiry are targeted at narrowing the recognized gap 
in the literature with regard to SA along the three 
central information dimensions, which are (1) re-
sponders’ specific SA-related information needs, 
which in turn lead to (2) certain SA-related informa-
tion behaviors of disaster response teams (for exam-
ple, in terms of seeking, collecting, or verifying in-
formation) as well as to (3) vertical and horizontal 
SA-related information flows between and among 
disaster response teams. This leads to the following 
three compound research questions, all of which ad-
dress the whats, hows, and whys, as well as the chal-
lenges in each informational dimension: 
Research Question #1 (RQ#1): 
 What are specific SA-related challenges for dis-
aster response teams on different levels of involve-
ment, and what are specific challenges to meet the 
information needs? 
Research Question #2 (RQ#2): 
 What are specific SA-related information shar-
ing challenges for disaster response teams, and what 
are specific challenges to responders’ information 
behaviors? 
Research Question #3 (RQ#3): 
 What are other challenges in the context of ac-
quiring and maintaining SA among and between dis-
aster response teams, and what are specific SA-
related challenges to responders’ information flows? 
4. Method Section  
Instrument and Coding Scheme. Based on the 
conceptual framework of resilient information infra-
structures (RIIs) [24] a semi-structured interview pro-
tocol was devised upfront, which covered six topical 
areas of (1) management and organization, (2) tech-
nology, (3) governance, (4) information, (5) informa-
tion infrastructure, and (6) RIIs/resiliency. A total of 
thirty-six interview questions and probes were incor-
porated.  
Sample. The sample was purposive [23] and in-
cluded responders from nine different groups: the (1) 
local responders, (2) County Emergency Operations 
Center, (3) urban search and rescue teams, (4) WA 
State (type-2) response teams, (5) responders from 
neighboring jurisdictions under mutual aid agree-
ments, (6) State Emergency Management Division, 
(7) WA State Department of Transportation, (8) WA 
State National Guard, and (9) Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), region X. A total of 
31 individuals were interviewed. 
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Data collection: Interviews were conducted in 
person between September 2014 and March 2015 and 
lasted between 55 to 261 minutes. One interview was 
conducted via Skype video conferencing. All inter-
views were audio taped, transcribed, and coded by at 
least two coders for analysis. During the interviews 
also notes were taken and participant interaction was 
observed and recorded. Moreover, other documents 
such as after-action reports and press interviews were 
collected, reviewed, and coded as appropriate.  
Data analysis and coding: The initial codebook, 
which was based on the aforementioned conceptual 
RII framework, contained six category codes (one for 
each topical area) and 134 sub-category codes. Addi-
tional codes were inductively introduced during data 
collection, in individual coding sessions, and inter-
coder sessions [14, 15, 25, 27]. Since a codebook in a 
hybrid approach of deductive and inductive analyses 
[12] is designed to be open to extension, it ultimately 
encompassed 151 sub-category codes in the six main 
categories. 
At least two researchers coded each transcript 
and document by means of a cloud-based software 
tool for qualitative and mixed-method data analyses 
(Dedoose main versions 6 And 7, dedoose.com). The 
coded data were compared one by one and demon-
strated high inter-rater reliability. 
The code frequency table revealed the highest 
numbers of code applications in the areas of “man-
agement and organization” (2,219), “technology” 
(968), and “information” (711). For the purpose of 
the specific analysis on situational awareness-related 
information needs, information behaviors, and infor-
mation flows the code intersection represented by the 
sub-codes of “situational awareness,” “address chal-
lenges of information sharing,” and “use of informa-
tion and communication technologies for information 
sharing” was selected, which produced 650 excerpts. 
Excerpts, which were between two and three 
paragraphs in length, were organized per responder 
team and conceptually analyzed. Recurring themes 
and main concepts were identified and named by 
means of key phrases and keywords. These con-
cepts/context clusters were transferred to the “can-
vas” of a cloud-based mapping tool (CMAP, version 
6.01.01). The concepts/context clusters were in-
spected and sorted into topical “bins” or “baskets,” in 
which chronological, logical, and other relationships 
were identified. Relationship links between con-
cepts/context clusters were established whenever evi-
dence from the data supported that link. 
Research team and processes. The research team 
consisted of the principal investigator (PI) and more 
than forty research assistants (RAs), both for-credit 
and voluntary. The PI and RAs worked individually 
and in small teams to transcribe, code, and conceptu-
ally/contextually analyze, and map the concepts. The 
research team met weekly in person or online and 
communicated via the research project site and the 
project listserv as well as via individual face-to-face 
and group meetings. All weekly meetings were 
streamed and recorded, which kept the whole re-
search team in sync over extended periods of time. 
5. Findings 
5.1 Ad research question #1 (responders’ spe-
cific SA-related challenges): 
 Gaining full situational awareness is acknowl-
edged as one of the most vexing challenges to re-
sponders on all levels. This appeared to be no differ-
ent in the case of the Oso/SR530 landslide response. 
Responders were in urgent need of acquiring reliable 
and accurate information on the extent and impact of 
the landslide. However, several challenges to gaining 
and maintaining SA were discovered across re-
sponder teams, predominantly during the first 24 to 
72 hours into the incident. But even after 72 hours 
several SA-related challenges persisted. 
Almost all responder groups mentioned the lack 
of sharing information in a timely fashion among re-
sponder groups during the early phases of the re-
sponse, which in turn led to incomplete SA and a dis-
torted common operating picture (COP). It appears 
from the data that shared situational awareness in 
terms of capturing the basic facts (and with it an ini-
tial shared COP) emerged only after 72 hours into the 
incident, if not even later. Interviewees attributed this 
delay in arriving at a shared SA to several intertwined 
factors: (1) in a geography known for frequent mud-
slides, the term “mudslide” or even “landslide” in 
early responder communications inadvertently 
framed a mental model pointing at a far minor inci-
dent than the one at hand. It took ground zero re-
sponders quite some time to change their mental 
model; however, also responders at County and EMD 
levels initially worked under the regular “mudslide” 
assumption. One responder remembered it with some 
explicit verbiage, 
So initially, it was like, hey, there’s a mud-
slide in Darrington, and it was like, so big 
f***ing deal, there’s mudslides everywhere. 
No, it’s a big one, yeah, OK, big f***ing 
deal, it’s a big mudslide. And then it was like, 
No, it’s a really f***ing big one. Oh, maybe, 
we, you know, we might end up going to this. 
So we asked our leadership. 
(2) The local responders on the ground had only 
a partial view onto the site of impact; on the Western 
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(Oso) side responders initially even thought that the 
slide might have come from the Southern hillsides. 
Their view on the failed slope was blocked, whereas 
the Eastern (Darrington) side responders had a clear 
view on the slope, which, however, did not necessar-
ily indicate a huge hillside failure from the angle and 
distance of observation; as a result, initially respond-
ers on neither side understood the extent of the slide 
and the large area impacted; rather than being sepa-
rated by debris from each other by about 100 or 200 
yards on the blocked and buried SR530 as they 
thought, they were in fact about a mile apart from 
each other. (3) County and other helicopters reached 
the debris field as early as 35 minutes after the land-
slide had occurred and engaged in search and rescue 
operations missing to systematically report back to 
the base about what they saw. However, while the 
aircrews clearly noticed the extent of the debris field, 
they were unable to identify the conditions on the 
ground, which differed substantially on the Western 
and Eastern edges of the debris field. Said one inter-
viewee, 
On Monday <March 24, 2014–insertion by 
authors> I don’t think everybody had a full 
idea of the scope of the slide yet, where the 
edges were. I know on Sunday they didn’t. It 
blew me away that we had, I forget how many 
helicopters in that initial response, and I’ve 
heard it at a number of these debriefings 
“Well, they were too busy doing rescues to 
tell anybody what was going on.” 
Another interviewee held, 
It was all about information. And an ability to 
articulate what you saw, and what you 
thought you understood, as well as be able to 
articulate the question: "What is really hap-
pening." I think that didn't get asked right 
away. Because people were so focused on 
what they know, or what they thought they 
knew. It created a sense of tunnel vision al-
most for them. 
And yet another responder affirmed, 
And I didn’t fully probably, 100% understand 
the enormity of it until I got out there and 
walked it, and walked from one end to the 
other in the mud and saw what our people 
were up against. On day 5 I did that. 
Although responders on the ground and in the air 
separately knew essential elements of information 
such as (1) affected area (aircrews), (2) characteris-
tics of the debris on the Western side (Oso respond-
ers), as opposed to (3) different characteristics of the 
debris on the Eastern side (Darrington responders), 
these elements were not immediately integrated to 
establish shared situational assessment, and subse-
quently, no shared common operating picture. One 
interviewee stated, 
I don’t think we had a central point for all 
that information to be reported through, and 
it kind of goes back to that thing we were 
talking about—information from the field be-
ing collected at a single point at the incident 
command post, being passed up to the EOC. 
And then information that’s coming into the 
EOC that we pass back down to the incident 
command post, because it bypassed them. 
Another interviewee said, 
At the beginning, I mean, the estimates that 
were coming from the Army Corps of Engi-
neers and WSDOT were insane. Insanely low, 
insanely high, there was nothing you could 
believe, and so there was always this kind of 
feeling of “We don’t know where we’re at. 
We don’t know what we’re doing, we don’t 
know what the impact is.” 
According to interviewees from various teams, 
communication and information sharing between the 
local incident command posts, the County EOC, 
which was not even activated to the highest level, and 
the fully activated State EOC, particularly on day 1 
and 2, but also into the first week of the response 
were slow and incomplete, which prevented shared 
situational awareness among response teams and the 
development of a shared common operating picture 
and coordinated incident action planning. 
Since the slide had remained active for an ex-
tended period of time, and the thick debris in many 
areas was wet and initially proved too dangerous for 
extended ground operations, search and rescue by air 
soon became the sole option. This, in turn, kept air-
crews from systematically reporting to the ICP and 
the EOC essential elements of information such as 
the identified extent of the slide and the boundary of 
the impacted area. 
While on the day of the incident the response 
was mostly handled by local responders from the Oso 
Fire Station, the County Fire District 21, the Darring-
ton Fire Station, State Troopers, the Arlington police, 
and the County Helicopter Rescue Team, the Re-
gional type-3 team took over the incident command 
on day 2. The type-3 team was followed by the first 
of two State type-2 teams beginning on day 6 (Thurs-
day, March 27, 2014). These gradual shifts from 
lower to higher-level and higher-capability response 
teams also demonstrate the growing situational 
awareness regarding the magnitude of the incident. 
The timing of the shifts shows the enormity of the 
incident was better understood no sooner than 
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Wednesday night, March 26, 2014). However, the 
handovers between teams also resulted in some fric-
tion and loss of situation detail knowledge. As an in-
terviewee said: 
The communication after that between the 
EOC and the IMT and the group out here 
working and the little satellite places like this 
fire department and Darrington Fire De-
partment and Arlington Fire Department... 
Communication between all these entities got 
a little fuzzy in there. And there’s where the 
email chain got lost. 
Another responder added, 
And towards the end, I think we had a much 
clearer view of “This is what we’re going to 
need, <and> this <is> what the next…six 
weeks is going to look like.” And we could 
start seeing that. But on day six, you didn’t 
have that. 
In summary, responders understood the enormity 
of the landslide only gradually, that is, situational 
awareness was established only slowly. This can be 
attributed to operating from an incorrect mental 
model (local mudslide) and the initial lack of system-
atically collecting and sharing essential elements of 
information, which hampered the establishment of a 
shared common operating picture, which in turn 
complicated the coordination of response efforts. 
With increasing understanding of the enormity of the 
incident at hand, higher capability response teams 
were activated and deployed. However, the hando-
vers from lower-level incident management teams to 
higher-level teams also led to loss of information de-
tail. 
5.2 Ad research question #2 (information shar-
ing challenges): 
 Sharing essential elements of information (EEI) 
among response units regarding the incident at hand, 
particularly, synchronously and in real time, is key to 
developing a comprehensive shared SA/COP and a 
coordinated response. For this to happen the incident 
management team (IMT) at the incident command 
post (ICP) along with the cognizant jurisdiction’s 
supporting emergency operations center (EOC) need 
to have a clear understanding of the essential ele-
ments of information relative to the incident. The 
larger an incident or disaster, the more parties are in-
volved in providing inputs to EEI and receiving EEI 
outputs, which in turn help generate a shared SA and 
COP. 
As it turned out, before the massive landslide the 
local responders had few, if any, detailed and coordi-
nated plans in place for a disaster of this kind and 
magnitude, nor were they prepared for systematically 
collecting EEI inputs and disseminating EEI outputs 
to response units and other important stakeholders. 
Initially, information was rather unsystematically col-
lected and disseminated. A local responder put it this 
way, 
When T. <the first incident commander on 
day 1 - insertion by authors> got there we 
started setting up some incident joint com-
mand with the state patrol and the sheriff's 
office and fire. We split a few frequencies off 
the main channel so we could talk separately. 
So there were some incident command stuff 
that was happening, but as far as training on 
what to do out there, it was like kids out in 
the mud puddle. There was just nothing. Ini-
tially we just blindly went out there and tried 
to find the people… 
When the WA State EMD and FEMA Region X 
support teams along with mutual aid teams from the 
region among others began to provide organizational 
assistance, the information situation improved. 
Interviewees reported on several barriers and im-
pediments that made it difficult to collect, integrate, 
and share EEI as quickly as desired: 
Technical barriers: The infrastructure for infor-
mation sharing such as file systems, email distribu-
tion lists, logistics systems, and networking arrange-
ments was heterogeneous to an extent, which made it 
impossible to easily, timely, and comprehensively 
share documents and messages among responders 
with a need to know. Furthermore, media breaks in 
the form of concurrently circulated, but not integrated 
paper documents, emails, and electronic documents 
led to an incomplete and distorted operating picture. 
But even electronic media could not readily be ex-
changed for the lack of an integrated secure interop-
erability platform for vertical exchanges among re-
sponders of different levels of government and for 
horizontal exchanges among responders from differ-
ent agencies. For example, according to one FEMA 
interviewee, 
Our systems have never, at least for as long 
as I’ve been here, never been interoperable 
with other systems. Our WebEOC does not 
talk to the State’s WebEOC and vice versa. 
And that’s the way it’s always been. The 
FEMA firewall’s always been an issue, and 
we know that, so we don’t try to solve it be-
cause we can’t. So we email stuff, basically. 
Organizational barriers: While technical barriers 
contributed their part to the overall difficulties of in-
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formation sharing and coordinated incident action 
planning (IAP), organizational weaknesses also 
posed additional barriers in this regard. Standards for 
inter-responder information sharing and messaging 
were missing so that completeness and timeliness of 
information provision was questionable. This was in 
part due to unclear responsibilities regarding not only 
what were the respective EEI, but also who would 
collect them, and with whom these were then to be 
shared, and when. As one responder observed, 
I think the next one was organizational, in 
that there was never, certainly in the first 48 
to 72 hours, I don’t think there was ever a 
clear delegation of authority. So that, I don’t 
know that there was ever clarity of the ... In 
many ways, the operations was operating at a 
different level or a different tempo than the 
oversight and the planning.  
While relatively early into the incident response 
conference calls were held and situation reports (si-
treps) were compiled and circulated at various levels 
on a daily and half-daily basis, in the earlier phase of 
response despite the availability of better information 
the sitreps were incomplete due to the lack of suffi-
cient integration of information from available 
sources. 
The aforementioned media breaks along with un-
recorded face-to-face communications added to the 
lack of information integration. No procedure was in 
place, which would track information flows and in-
formation utilization with regard to respective actions 
taken. Said one local responder, 
I was overwhelmed and I didn’t even know it. 
I didn’t feel like I was overwhelmed. I didn’t 
feel that world spinning, adrenaline rush out 
of control. But didn’t recognize that I was 
overwhelmed until days later when I listened 
to the radio tape. I was like, “Oh my god, I 
missed some calls. I missed a lot of things” I 
started to think about some of the things I had 
written down. 
Other barriers, which were both technical and 
organizational in nature, include the difficulty of 
scaling information acquisition, dissemination, and 
utilization processes in an ever more complex re-
sponse environment, in which finally over 100 gov-
ernment agencies of all levels became involved. 
Moreover, information access regulations and related 
protocols made it difficult to share information be-
tween teams, for example, between FEMA, State, 
County, and the IMT. As one responder pointed out,  
It’s sensitive information, and so there are 
rules and protocols for how that information 
can be shared. 
This led to some unique arrangements, which 
another responder described like this, 
They worked out ways to transfer that infor-
mation, which was laborious, physically get-
ting an encrypted hard drive, giving that to 
the ICP, so they could put their data on that, 
and then driving to Arlington to get that, and 
then driving that back. 
In summary, technical and organizational barriers 
played a major role in hampering effective informa-
tion sharing among responders of various levels. As a 
result, SA and a shared COP were slowly established, 
and as a consequence incident action planning was 
sub-optimally coordinated between responder teams. 
5.3 Ad research question #3 (other challenges 
including information flow challenges): 
 As already presented the lack of standards for in-
formation sharing and messaging slowed down the 
flow of information among and between responders. 
However, other challenges included the mix and op-
erations of synchronous (for example, face-to-face, 
via cell phone, satellite phone, landline, conference 
calls, or radio) and asynchronous communication (for 
example, email or postings). 
Synchronous Communication. Radio communica-
tion has remained the most important tool for coordi-
nating and messaging among responder teams. This 
was not any different in the Oso/SR530 landslide re-
sponse. Initially, however, many teams found them-
selves with incompatible radios and radio frequen-
cies, which needed updating and patching in order to 
communicate. Since in the first few days also cell 
phone connections were weak or spotty, while the 
fiber cable between the Arlington and Darrington 
sites was cut by the slide, workarounds had to be im-
plemented in order to enable synchronous communi-
cation. FEMA and mutual-aid partners were able to 
overcome these technical difficulties relatively 
quickly. However, whereas synchronous communica-
tion is indispensable and critically important in disas-
ter response management, important information ex-
changed in synchronous mode is often not docu-
mented and shared with other responders who have a 
need to know, which might hamper the information 
flow to and from those responders not directly in-
volved in the synchronous exchange. 
Mostly, everybody uses their own personal 
cell phones. We have found that to be the best 
way, you know, you’re just talking. The prob-
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lem with that, I will say, is, with the three-day 
turnover, then that’s the contact that you had, 
whoever they were, and then they were gone. 
Face-to-face communication was essential; how-
ever, the communicated information could easily 
be lost, whenever staff turned over and the re-
spective information had remained unrecorded. 
Another responder remarked in this context, 
In general, information got shared every 
couple hours when there were debriefs. It was 
still pretty chaotic. I’ll just speak for me. 
When there was something specific for me, I 
would go out and talk to the people in the 
field do get a better handle on it. 
In other words, spoken and written information 
was insufficiently integrated, or incompletely 
recorded, so that responders had to double-check 
before action could be taken. 
Asynchronous Communication. Email, texting, 
and postings were widely and frequently used during 
the Oso/SR530 landslide response. Also, print docu-
ments were circulated. The known crux with asyn-
chronous communication is (a) the missing acknow-
ledgement from the receiving side and (b) the unde-
termined consequence and action resulting from the 
input. Cases were reported that requests and impor-
tant information shared via email or postings had re-
mained unattended, and no action was taken demon-
strating the weakness of this particular way of com-
munication in mostly time-critical disaster manage-
ment. One responder was very clear about this, 
Your email is not a form of communication, 
it's actually a way to share some information, 
but if you actually need to communicate with 
somebody, you may send them an email, and 
then you should pick up the phone and say 
'Hey, I know this sounds odd, but I sent you 
this email, it's got some information in it, I 
need you to look at it and we can either talk 
while you're looking at it, or you need to call 
me back. 
Geographical Obstacles. While the Western (Ar-
lington) side of the landslide was easily accessible for 
arriving response teams, the Eastern (Darrington) 
side was literally cut off when the State Route 530 
had been covered by a thick and wide layer of debris, 
which for months would effectively isolate the upper-
valley communities from easy access to supplies and 
services. Interestingly, also in the management of at 
least the initial response the Darrington side was not 
as integrated as the Arlington side, which became 
visible, for example, in an imbalance of resource al-
locations favoring the Western side. The Darrington 
side also had a relatively weak information infra-
structure with slow network connections making it 
difficult for the incident command post located in Ar-
lington and the County EOC in Everett to communi-
cate with the Eastern side. As a result, information 
flows between the three sides were relatively slow, 
and IAPs were initially relatively loosely coordi-
nated. One interviewee remembered,  
There was very limited reporting. There were 
only two situation reports, I think, going out 
on a day, and they changed very little. When I 
developed a written donations plan and 
status, and had included a list of the contacts, 
I asked them where I should house it. They 
said, “Just keep it.” It’s like, well, that 
doesn’t work. You know, nobody knows about 
it. There was no place to put it. So I emailed 
it to the planning unit, but they did nothing 
with it, to my knowledge. And I emailed it out 
to a bunch of other people, too. Same thing 
with reunification for personal belongings. 
Similarly, the USAR team operating on the East-
ern side of the debris field also complained about a 
lack of planning and cooperation on part of the 
County (in terms of mass fatality handling) and a lack 
of coordination on part of the IMT at Arlington, 
which led the USAR team to skipping protocol and 
making their own decentralized decisions and IAPs. 
Said one response leader, 
In this incident, the medical examiner never 
showed up, so all investigation was handled 
by the task force, all documentation was han-
dled by the task force, and we did a great job. 
I’m very proud of the job that was done. But 
that’s not what we normally do. Normally we 
find them, extract them, you know, to a place 
that ... even before we extract them there’s 
somebody documenting it. But in this case, 
there was none of that. We handled it, and 
then, in addition, we handled all the protocol 
for how were we going to move them in the 
presence of family, in the presence of rela-
tives, and there were no policies that were es-
tablished by command.  
Local Community Involvement. Despite grief and 
shock, local residents and family members were im-
portant sources of information guiding the search and 
rescue operations. Local community members were 
the first to accurately inform the arriving response 
teams of the potential damage to life and property, 
which prompted the ramping up of resources and 
provided valuable information to the response teams 
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on-site. The locals were also of important help when 
locations of missing landmarks needed identification, 
and when the best access points to the debris field 
had to be determined. On the other hand, by involv-
ing family and community members in the response, 
the responders provided a tremendous opportunity for 
managing the community and families’ difficult emo-
tional situation. When approached by enraged and 
highly concerned family members, responders 
calmed the situation by sharing their plan and offer-
ing a way to involve them as volunteers. As one re-
sponder reported saying,  
This is our plan... If somebody is out there, 
then we are going to find them, but this is the 
procedure. You can either be part of it, or 
you can go away, and if you don’t go away, 
we can have the sheriff whisk you away. I 
don’t want to push you away, I want you to 
be involved, and here is the way you can be 
involved, but you have got to cooperate. It to-
tally changed their demeanor. We never had 
any issues here. It was pretty amazing. 
Working with the urban search and rescue teams 
the volunteers had an opportunity to serve as effec-
tive sources of information. 
In summary, other challenges to gaining and 
maintaining SA and a shared COP leading to coordi-
nated IAPs included the modes of information ex-
change (synchronous and asynchronous) along with 
geographical obstacles. Involving locals, in contrast, 
significantly helped responders on site understand the 
situation and navigating the debris field. 
6. Discussion 
Situation Awareness According to the Endsley 
Framework. The State Commission Report of De-
cember 2014 [20] claims that the “magnitude of the 
SR530 Landslide was not fully comprehended for 
several hours <emphasis by authors>” (p. 8). This 
representation, however, is incorrect; it should rather 
read “for several days.” When using the aforemen-
tioned Endsley framework of situational awareness 
[9, 11] in this case, it is evident that basic level-1 SA 
(knowing the basic facts) was reached no sooner than 
day 4), whereas level-2 SA (comprehending the 
situation) emerged around the time the first type-2 
team was brought in on day 6, and level-3 SA (pro-
jecting and anticipating future developments) took 
yet another few days, which became very clear 
through the interviews, but which is also well-
documented and detailed in the FEMA Daily Opera-
tions Briefings in the first couple of weeks (see 
htwww.disastercenter.com/FEMA+Daily+Ops+Briefi
ng+INSERT_DATE.pdf) after the landslide. The in-
correct representation of SA/COP-related facts, how-
ever, unfortunately, leads to overlooking the serious-
ness of systemic problems unveiled in this study. 
Ex-ante Planning for Collecting EEI. Given the 
duration, scale and scope of the incident, one can 
classify the Oso/SR530 landslide “massive” for a 
small town, or “partial” for a small city, which would 
make it a category-4 to -5 disaster according to 
Fischer’s ten disaster categories [13]. It is noteworthy 
that a disaster of a medium category can already be 
highly demanding to local, State, and federal re-
sponse efforts, not least of which in terms of shared 
SA, shared COP, and coordinated IAPs. Snohomish 
County and its municipalities were caught by this in-
cident obviously flat-footed. 
While the County Emergency Management De-
partment with a FTE staff of fourteen had some plans 
in place, it had no plans prepared for dealing with 
massive landslides, and no hazard-specific EEI had 
been developed, which would have helped coordinate 
the various response teams and efforts more easily. 
As the disaster response revealed, the County also did 
not have a pre-coordinated plan for dealing with mass 
fatalities. Also, the County EOC was not even fully 
activated during the incident response and left with-
out leadership, since the EMD director decided to in-
volve himself at the ICP in Arlington, while simulta-
neously the Deputy EMD Director was deployed to 
the Darrington side, which introduced additional con-
fusion, coordination problems between IMT and 
EOC, and added to the lack of both SA and COP-
based coordination.  
Furthermore, authority for carrying out response 
efforts by other and high-capability partners appeared 
to have been delegated in fairly limited and sort of 
ambiguous ways. This had a direct detrimental influ-
ence on almost all aspects related to shared SA, 
shared COP, and shared IAPs.  
In other words, the level of preparedness on part 
of the County for a disaster of this extent appears to 
have room for improvement including the develop-
ment of a sound understanding and practice of EMD 
leadership roles during an unfolding disaster.  
Missing Standards for Information Sharing. In the 
United States, incidents are regularly managed on the 
basis of structures and standards defined in the Na-
tional Incident Management System (NIMS) and the 
Incident Command System (ICS) at its core. ICS em-
ploys a hierarchical command-and-control structure 
with clear responsibilities along with interfaces be-
tween various general staff sections (operations, 
planning, logistics, and finance/administration) and 
the command staff (public information, safety, and 
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liaison). Incident management teams (IMTs) under 
ICS work with local emergency operations centers 
(EOCs), which coordinate resources and incident 
support along fifteen emergency support functions 
(ESFs). While the IMT under ICS is hierarchically 
organized [5], which has been much criticized in the 
academic literature for various reasons [2, 7, 28], the 
EOCs on various levels provide essential capabilities 
and resources, which  make the whole response effort 
function more like a hybrid or matrix organization 
rather than a pure and simple hierarchical organiza-
tion. 
In an emergent complex organization like the 
Oso/SR530 landslide response, which had numerous 
ad-hoc elements and entities requiring coordination, 
effective vertical and lateral flows of information are 
of the essence. However, standards or unified proto-
cols for information sharing and messaging appear to 
be missing. Such content-related standards would, for 
example, include but are not limited to the aforemen-
tioned hazard-specific templates for EEI, lists of EEI-
related information owners/providers, distribution 
lists of responders and response support functions 
with a need to know, and information distribution 
tracking mechanisms. 
Lack of Information Integration. In a complex 
multi-agency incident response like the Oso/SR530 
landslide response, information is collected, gener-
ated, and shared in various modes and formats. In-
formation integration was missing due to various fac-
tors, for example, such as media breaks, that is, 
pieces of information were recorded and shared on 
paper, others were maintained electronically, and yet 
others were communicated verbally; however, the 
various pieces were not systematically put together, 
which led to ambiguity and a distorted COP. Other 
obstacles hampering information integration included 
unclear information dissemination procedures and 
frequent staff turnovers, which led to losses of impor-
tant information.  
Lack of information sharing and integration re-
sults in a phenomenon known as “siloing” [1]. Infor-
mation silos emerge, whenever information is re-
tained by individuals or not widely shared for a vari-
ety of different reasons mentioned above. Evidence 
of siloing manifested in the interviews when respon-
dents complained that information they needed ex-
isted, but was not accessible. It has to be noted that 
information silos would not automatically be dis-
solved with the introduction of more advanced tech-
nology. Instead management practices and informa-
tion architecture issues must be addressed to resolve 
siloing. 
In order to improve inter-unit information sharing 
and coordination, various response units deployed 
liaisons at other units who effectively helped with bi-
directional information sharing and coordination. 
However, the liaisons were able to only connect and 
report bi-directionally what they noticed in their 
given roles potentially missing important pieces of 
information. In consequence, this important area of 
information integration needs further study to be bet-
ter understood. 
Lack of a Unified Information Architecture and 
System Platform. Response units used different sys-
tems such as SharePoint, WebEOC, Google Docs, 
simple email, and traditional paper documents to re-
cord and organize their tasks and resource requests. 
The IMT/ICP and the County EOC physically ex-
changed information once a day via an encrypted 
hard disk, which was shipped back and forth between 
the two sites. Moreover, while the County EOC used 
SharePoint for sharing and storing documents, the 
State EMD and FEMA region X utilized their respec-
tive versions of Intermedia’s WebEOC for task and 
resource tracking. However, even between the FEMA 
WebEOC and the State WebEOC data exchanges 
were made impossible, since the systems were fire-
walled and shielded against access from and ex-
changes with the outside world. In contrast, the type-
2 IMT employed a low-tech approach using email, 
paper documents, and the aforementioned encrypted 
hard disk for information sharing, all of which would 
not make information sharing timely and easy. A 
similar multitude of approaches and platforms was 
found also in the area of resource requesting, on 
which the project team reports in a separate paper on 
“managerial challenges.” In a nutshell, information 
sharing and information processing among and be-
tween response units was rather cumbersome and 
slow during the response, at least in the earlier stages.  
As pointed out, the larger and the more dynamic 
an incident the larger the ad-hoc matrix organization 
handling the incident inevitably grows. While basic 
interfaces underneath the NIMS/ICS and EOC/ESF 
umbrellas are relatively well defined, it is surprising 
that the most important enabler and potential facilita-
tor of a complex matrix organization in an unfolding 
incident, that is, a unified information architecture 
and a corresponding information system platform has 
remained undefined and non-standardized. 
What might work well for a single-jurisdiction 
EOC and a single IMT/ICP when responding to a 
smaller scale/scope/duration incident, provided they 
use the same information architecture and system 
platform (for example, with WebEOC), appears to 
not scale well at all, once an incident of larger scale, 
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scope, and duration is at hand. In the aftermath of the 
Oso/SR530 landslide, the State of Washington stan-
dardized its emergency-related resource request and 
tracking procedures, also introducing standardized 
forms. It appears that a similar approach to define 
and devise a unified system architecture by standard-
izing secure information processing, information or-
ganization and record management, information shar-
ing procedures, information system platforms, and 
application program interfaces (APIs). As suggested 
in the previous section, more research is needed also 
in this particular area. 
The Commission Report. In light of the findings 
of this study, the State Commission Report [20] cor-
rectly points at major problems with gaining and 
maintaining situational awareness, and it distin-
guishes four categories of infrastructure, interoper-
ability, content, and strategy, into which these “is-
sues” fall (p. 28). However, when analyzing the 
causes, the report mostly refers to problems and fail-
ures in the physical and technological infrastructures 
and their consequences for system interoperability. 
Hence it misses to identify problems rooted much 
more deeply and more widely, which this study un-
veiled. As a result, the Report downplays the severity 
of the overall problem and simply concludes to rec-
ommend the implementation of better and more tech-
nology such as the proposed Federal initiative of 
FirstNet (www.firstnet.gov/) and the use of drones 
for better reconnaissance. While undoubtedly high-
speed wireless digital data connections could greatly 
improve information exchanges in disaster response, 
the aforementioned deeper problems of lacking ex-
ante planning of EEI, lacking information integration, 
and lacking a unified Information Architecture and 
System Platform would still remain unaddressed. 
Furthermore, using drones in a tight airspace while 
simultaneously airborne operations were carried out 
by helicopter search and rescue teams would have 
introduced great safety risks and uncontrollable com-
plexity for air control, which is why air operations 
commanders turned down respective requests. How-
ever, immediate higher-altitude reconnaissance 
flights, for example, by fixed-wing aircraft equipped 
with high-resolution photographic and forward-
looking infrared radiometer (FLIR) capabilities might 
have given a more comprehensive picture of the im-
pacted area sooner. 
In summary, problems of gaining and maintaining 
shared SA and arriving at a shared COP leading to 
coordinated IAPs encompass intertwined problems 
related to planning, information sharing, information 
integration, information architecture, and information 
system platforms, which need further study. More 
advanced technology alone will not resolve the iden-
tified problems. 
7. Conclusions  
It has been the object of this study to explore and 
identify major problem areas of information man-
agement in disaster response, which hinder the rap-
idly development and maintenance of shared situ-
ational awareness and a shared common operating 
picture. Responders’ diverse information needs, their 
information behavior throughout various stages of 
responding, and the respective information flows 
have not been systematically identified. 
In the course of the study, it was found that lack 
in hazard-related planning hampered systematic in-
formation collection and sharing; also, the lack of 
standardized information sharing procedures and in-
formation integration practices were found detrimen-
tal to gaining and maintaining shared SA/COP. Fur-
thermore, the absence of a unified information archi-
tecture and information system platform further ex-
acerbates the information “siloing” problem. This 
study strongly suggests that further study in these 
particular areas is necessary. In parallel, the project 
team also studied related “managerial challenges” in 
the Oso/SR530 landslide response, which are pub-
lished in a separate paper. 
This study reports on the response in the single 
case of the 2014 Oso/SR530 landslide. A study of a 
single case inherently introduces certain limitations 
with regard to the transferability of results. However, 
while this particular disaster ranks in the medium 
section of the Fischer Disaster Scale [13], the ob-
served complexities in the response, nevertheless, 
provide ample evidence of SA/COP-related problems 
to be systemic. 
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